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about the sources of income prediction errors and how agents respond to income shocks. This paper uses
a unique panel data set to examine the accuracy of physicians’ income expectations, the sources of
income prediction errors, and the effect of income prediction errors on physician behavior. The data set
contains direct survey measures of income expectations for medical students who graduated between
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specific shocks, such as the growth of health maintenance organizations (HMOs) and other changes
across health care markets. Physicians who experienced negative income shocks were more likely to
respond by increasing their hours worked, allocating fewer of their work hours to teaching/research and
more to patient care, and were more likely to switch specialties. 
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I.  Introduction 
Income expectations are an important determinant of many economic decisions, including 
schooling and occupational choice.  However, little is known about the accuracy of income expectations, 
the sources of income prediction errors, and how people respond to income shocks (Manski, 1993).  Since 
income expectations are rarely directly observed, the most common approach in empirical applications is 
to assume that expectations are rational and infer income expectations from panel data on realized 
income. (See Dominitz and Manski (1997) for a review of this literature, and Willis and Rosen (1979) for 
an example of this approach.)  However, Manski (1993) has shown that misspecifying how income 
expectations are formed can lead to incorrect inferences about peoples’ behavior given their expectations, 
for instance the responsiveness of school enrollment to the expected return to schooling.   
There are only a few existing studies that assess the accuracy of income expectations, usually by 
comparing survey measures of income expectations with subsequent income realizations.  Das and van 
Soest (1999) examine data from the Dutch Socio-Economic Panel, which asked people to predict whether 
in the next year their household income would decrease, remain unchanged, or increase.  They find that 
between 1984 and 1989 their sample substantially underestimated their income growth; income 
expectations were too pessimistic on average.  Using a U.S. sample, Dominitz (1998) compares one-year-
ahead income predictions in 1993, elicited in the form of subjective probabilities, with peoples’ actual 
income in 1994.  He finds income expectations were too optimistic, by contrast.
1    
There are a number of limitations to the existing literature.  First, one should not necessarily 
 
1 Most other studies of the accuracy of household expectations have used aggregated data on inflation 
expectations (e.g., Maddala, Fishe, and Lahiri, 1981; Gramlich, 1983; Batchelor, 1986).
  However, when agents’ 
information sets differ, aggregation can lead to spurious rejections of rationality. Some papers have indirectly 
modeled occupational choice without observing peoples’ subjective income expectations.  Zarkin (1985) examines 
whether prospective teachers incorporate forecastable demand conditions into their decision to enter the occupation. 
He finds that future student enrollment rationally affects the occupational decisions of secondary school teachers, but 
not of elementary school teachers.  Siow (1984) assumes that prospective lawyers expect future cohorts of students 




expect prediction errors to average out to zero over a relatively short sample period (Souleles, 2001; 
Keane and Runkle, 1998).  As a result, expectations that are rational ex ante might not appear rational ex 
post.  For instance, the respondents in the two studies above might by chance have received positive and 
negative income shocks, respectively, over their short sample periods.  Analyses of the accuracy of 
income expectations therefore require long sample periods.  Souleles (2001) examines 18 years of 
monthly data from the Michigan Survey of Consumer Attitudes and Behavior.  This survey records 
household expectations and subsequent realizations for a number of variables, including household 
income and financial security, inflation, and aggregate economic activity.  Souleles finds that even over a 
long sample period, expectations of most of these variables appear to be biased and inefficient, at least ex 
post.  He traces these results in part to aggregate shocks, like the business cycle and changes in monetary 
policy regime, as well as group-level shocks (e.g., shocks that disproportionately hit low education 
workers).   
A second limitation of the literature is that the answers to the expectations questions are usually 
constrained to be discrete (e.g., Will income increase, decrease, or stay the same?), which complicates the 
analysis.  Third, the expectations are usually limited to a one-year horizon, whereas life-cycle decisions 
like occupational choice depend on longer-horizon expectations.  A final limitation is that most studies 
that reject the rationality of expectations do not explain why they reject, or whether the shocks that caused 
the prediction errors significantly altered people’s subsequent behavior.   
In this paper we examine the accuracy of physicians’ income expectations, the sources of income 
prediction errors, and the effect of income prediction errors on physician behavior.  We test, for example, 
whether the income prediction errors of specialists are significantly related to the advent of managed care, 
and whether physicians change their hours worked if their income turns out to be different than expected. 
 We use a unique panel data set that allows us to overcome many of the limitations of previous studies of 
income expectations.  The Jefferson Longitudinal Database contains information on all medical students 3 
 
who graduated from Jefferson Medical College, a large medical school in Philadelphia, since 1970.   The 
data set contains direct survey measures of medical students’ subjective income expectations, the 
students’ actual practice income at various points during their medical career, and a rich set of 
demographic and ability measures.  In the fourth year of medical school, Jefferson students have been 
asked to predict the following: the specialty in which they will practice, their income 5, 10, and 20 years 
after completing residency training (i.e., their income with 5, 10, and 20 years of post-residency 
experience), peak career income, and characteristics of their medical practice.  In 1998 we devised a 
follow-up survey asking the same Jefferson physicians to report their current income, their income 
realizations in the same years for which they had previously stated their expected income, and the actual 
characteristics of their practice.  The physicians were also asked to identify market and practice changes 
that occurred throughout their career, and to distinguish changes that were anticipated and unanticipated 
as of the time they formed their expectations.  These unique questions allow us to reconstruct the 
physicians’ information sets and identify shocks that might explain their prediction errors. 
The Jefferson Survey is particularly well suited to analyze income expectations because it solicits 
open-ended (continuous) income expectations over a person’s lifecycle.  By 1998, the Jefferson graduates 
had been practicing medicine for up to 25 years, a period that might be long enough to allow negative and 
positive shocks to average out to zero if expectations are unbiased.  Moreover, the sample period includes 
almost 30 cohorts of physicians.  By contrast, if we tracked only a few cohorts of medical students, say 
those who graduated before 1975, then a large permanent shock to the physician services market in the 
late 1970s might lead one to reject the rationality of expectations based on incomes realized in the 1980s 
and 1990s.  Medical students who graduate in the 1980s and 1990s, however, should have incorporated 
this shock into their own income expectations. 
In a previous paper, Nicholson and Souleles (2001), we analyzed the original Jefferson income 
expectations data to try to identify the information that students use when forming income expectations, 4 
 
                                                
and to examine whether subjective income expectations can help explain students’ specialty choices.  We 
found that medical students condition their expectations in part on the contemporaneous income of 
physicians practicing in the specialty they plan to enter, but not on a one-for-one basis.  This suggests that 
expectations are not strictly myopic.
2  In fact, we found evidence that expectations are partly forward-
looking: after students entering a given specialty reported relatively high income expectations, physicians 
in that specialty subsequently tended to experience higher income growth relative to other specialties, as 
measured by aggregated physician income data from the American Medical Association (AMA).  We also 
found that the subjective income expectations were more useful in predicting specialty choice than 
contemporaneous physician income.  These results suggest that the subjective expectations variables are 
quite informative.  However, without the actual physician-specific realizations of income and other data 
solicited in the 1998 follow-up survey, we were not able to assess formally the accuracy of the 
expectations, explore the sources of prediction errors, nor examine the welfare implications of prediction 
errors.  
This paper examines a number of aspects of physician income expectations and realizations.  
First, we compare a physician’s actual income to the income he expected when he was a fourth-year 
medical student to gauge the accuracy of income expectations, including their unbiasedness and 
efficiency.  Second, and more importantly, we analyze the sources of any systematic prediction errors.  In 
particular, can the results be explained by ex post shocks to realized income?  The richness of the data 
allows us to analyze many salient possible shocks.  For example, are income prediction errors more 
negative for female physicians?  Do medical students under or over estimate the returns to ability?  More 
generally, we examine how prediction errors vary cross-sectionally and over time.  This allows us to 
characterize the shocks that have hit physicians in different specialties at different points between 1970 
and 1998.  For instance, to what extent did changes in the structure of health insurance in a physician’s 
 
2  If income is serially correlated across cohorts, rational expectations of income should be partly correlated 5 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
market, such as the emergence of health maintenance organizations (HMOs), lead to income prediction 
errors?  Third, we examine whether shocks that cause income prediction errors significantly altered 
physicians’ subsequent behavior.  How much flexibility do physicians have to respond to shocks, and 
along what margins do they respond?  For instance, do  they adjust their hours worked?  In light of the 
central role of income risk in many economic decisions, such an analysis of income shocks should be of 
independent and general interest.  
  We find that medical students made systematic income prediction errors, even over the long, 28-
year sample period.  We trace the errors in large part to persistent specialty-specific shocks.  
Unanticipated market and practice changes, such as changes in demand for physician services and in 
payments from health insurers, help explain much of the cross-sectional variation in prediction errors 
across physicians.  For example, specialist physicians (e.g., surgeons and obstetricians) practicing in 
markets with relatively high HMO enrollment earned substantially less than they expected relative to 
physicians in these same specialties practicing in markets with average levels of HMO enrollment.  More 
generally, the results call into question the common assumption that aggregate shocks affect people 
uniformly. Empirical implementations of rational expectations (or forward-looking) models therefore 
need to account for richer systematic heterogeneity in prediction errors.  We also find that income 
prediction errors help explain subsequent physician behavior.  Physicians who experienced negative 
income shocks were more likely to respond by increasing their hours worked, allocating fewer of their 
work hours to teaching/research and more to patient care, and were more likely to switch specialties.   
These results imply that market and practice shocks have substantial welfare effects.   
  The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We describe the data in more detail in Section II.  
In Section III we present the empirical method for assessing the accuracy of income expectations, 
identifying the sources of income prediction errors, and examining the effect of prediction errors on 
 
with contemporaneous income.  6 
 
                                                
changes that physicians make to their medical practice.  We present results in Section IV and offer 
concluding comments in Section V. 
 
II.  Data 
The Jefferson Longitudinal Database contains unique information about physicians’ expectations 
regarding their medical practice.  In 1970 Jefferson Medical College began surveying its medical students 
in their fourth year of medical school.  Students are asked to predict the specialty in which they will 
practice and their income from medical practice.  Between 1970 and 1979, students were asked to state 
the income, after medical expenses and before taxes, they expected to receive 5, 10, and 20 years after 
completing residency training, and the peak income they expected to receive during their career.
3   
Students were asked, “…(to) assume that dollars maintain their present value …” when stating their 
expected income.  Students who graduated after 1979 have been asked to predict only their peak income, 
not income after 5, 10, and 20 years of experience.  The Jefferson Longitudinal Study contains 
information on all 5,995 alumni who graduated between 1970 and 1998, most of whom are now 
practicing physicians.  In the first column of Table 1 we report means of key variables for the entire 
sample.     
The Jefferson database includes demographic information and rich measures of student ability 
and performance in school.  Medical students must pass three national exams before they can receive a 
license to practice medicine in the United States.  Part 1 of the National Board of Medical Examiners 
(NBME) test is administered after the second year of medical school and covers the classroom material 
taught during the first two years (e.g., anatomy, physiology, pharmacology).
4  Jefferson students who 
 
3  Most medical students complete between three and five years of residency training, depending on the 
specialty, before practicing medicine.  We consider a physician to begin “practicing medicine” when he completes 
residency training. 
4  The second part of the NBME exam is administered in the fourth year of medical school and the third part 
is administered in the first year of a student’s residency program.  We focus on the Part 1 score as a measure of 
student ability and performance because this exam occurred before students stated their income expectations. 7 
 
                                                
graduated between 1996 and 1998 received an average score of 209.1 on Part 1 of the NBME, referred to 
hereafter as the board score.  The average board score for all students who graduated from a U.S. medical 
school during this same time period was 210.8, so Jefferson students appear to be generally representative 
of U.S. medical students.
5   
In 1998 we mailed surveys to all the individuals who graduated from Jefferson Medical College 
between 1970 and 1979, the period during which students predicted their income with 5, 10, and 20 years 
of post-residency experience, as well as their peak career income.  In 1998 these alumni had been 
practicing medicine between 13 and 25 years.  They were asked to report current characteristics of their 
practice such as their specialty, the average number of hours they work per week, and their patients’ 
sources of health insurance.  The Jefferson alumni also reported their medical practice income (after 
expenses but before taxes) for the previous year (1997), as well as their practice income 5, 10, and 20 
years after they completed residency training, without making any adjustments for inflation.
6  These 
income realizations correspond in time to the income expectations the physicians provided when they 
were fourth-year medical students.  An impressive 93 percent of the physicians who completed the 1998 
follow-up survey reported their practice income for each year requested.  
The follow-up survey allows us to calculate income prediction errors -- the difference between 
actual and expected income -- for each respondent in their 5
th, 10
th, and,
 for older physicians, their 20
th 
year of practicing medicine.  Since the income prediction errors, like other variables solicited from 
surveys, will inevitably be measured with some error, we also asked physicians the following question: 
“Overall, how did your actual practice income in your 10
th year [or 20
th year for older physicians] 
compare with the income that you expected when you were a fourth-year medical student (after taking 
 
5  The standard deviation of the board score among students who graduated from U.S. medical schools 
between 1996 and 1998 is 18.  
6 The question for 1997 income was worded as follows: “Please estimate your income from medical 
practice in 1997 to the nearest $10,000, after professional expenses but before taxes.  Please include all income from 
fees, salaries, risk pools, retainers, bonuses and other forms of compensation.” 8 
 
inflation into consideration)?”  The physician could report that his actual income was higher, lower, or 
about the same as previously expected.  This “subjective assessment” variable allows us to instrument for 
a respondent’s income prediction error when it is used as an independent variable in analyzing the impact 
of the errors on subsequent behavior.  We undertake additional checks for measurement error below. 
The 1998 follow-up survey tried to identify the reasons why a physician’s realized income might 
be higher or lower than had been expected.  Physicians who have been practicing medicine for 20 years or 
more were asked to identify changes in the health care market (e.g., a decrease in the payments received 
from health insurance companies, or an increase in demand for their services) and changes they made to 
their practice (e.g., an increase in hours worked) that occurred during their first 20 years of practicing and 
had a significant effect on their income in the 20
th year.  Physicians who had been practicing for fewer 
than 20 years were asked a similar question regarding their experience during the first 10 years of 
practicing medicine.  The physicians were then asked to indicate which of these market and practice 
changes had been expected when they were fourth-year medical students.  This information allows us to 
reconstruct a student’s information set at the time he stated his expected income.  Household data sets 
rarely contain such rich data regarding information sets.   
In the 1998 follow-up survey we also asked physicians to identify any substantial changes they 
made to their practice (e.g., changes in hours worked, or in the number of uninsured patients treated) 
since their 20
th or 10
th year of practicing medicine, depending on whether the respondent had been 
practicing for more than or fewer than 20 years.  This information allows us to examine whether and how 
physicians altered their behavior in response to shocks they faced over their careers, as measured by the 
income prediction errors.  We also asked the Jefferson alumni to forecast their retirement age and 
whether, with hindsight, they would have selected the same specialty in medical school, selected a 
different specialty, or would have left the medical profession altogether. 
In 1999 we mailed a similar follow-up survey to all students who graduated from Jefferson 9 
 
Medical College between 1980 and 1998.  After 1979 Jefferson asked its students to predict only their 
peak income.  Therefore, the 1999 follow-up survey splits physicians into two groups according to their 
response to the following question: “Do you think that your income from medical practice has already 
peaked, or has not yet peaked.”  Physicians who believed their income had already reached its maximum 
value, after taking inflation into consideration, were asked to report the year in which their real income 
from medical practice peaked as well as the actual peak amount.  For these physicians we can calculate an 
income prediction error by comparing the actual peak income to the peak income expected as of the 
fourth year of medical school, with both variables adjusted for inflation.  
Respondents who believed in 1999 that their income had yet to reach its peak were asked to 
report their current expectations for peak income.  This allows us to calculate the difference between a 
respondent’s current expectation for peak income and his expectation for peak income when he was a 
fourth-year medical student.  Like the prediction errors, this difference reflects the arrival of new 
information.  All respondents of the 1999 follow-up survey were also asked to report their income from 
medical practice for the most recently completed year (1998), as well as their practice income for 1992. 
We structured the rest of the follow-up survey for the 1980-1998 graduates in the same way as 
the survey for the 1970-1979 graduates.  Members of the former group were asked to document changes 
in the health care market and their practice between the year they graduated from medical school and 
either the year in which their income peaked, or 1999 if they believed their income had yet to reach its 
peak.  They were asked to identify changes they made to their practice since their income peaked, or 
changes they expect to make in the future if they believe their income has not yet peaked.  The students 
also provided subjective assessments of whether their actual peak income was higher, lower, or about the 
same as expected (or whether their current expectation for peak income was higher, lower, or about the 
same as their original expectation for peak income). 
Forty-four percent of the Jefferson Medical College alumni (2,631 individuals) completed the 10 
 
                                                
follow-up surveys.  This is an unusually good response rate for a mail survey, especially in light of the 
sensitive nature of the income and other survey questions. Even so, since we know a great deal about the 
non-respondents from the survey and other information collected during medical school, we can check for 
evidence of selection bias in completing the follow-up survey.  Means for the main variables collected 
during medical school are reported in column 2 of Table 1 for those individuals who completed the 
follow-up survey.  In general, the characteristics of the respondents to the follow-up survey are quite 
similar to the entire population of students who graduated between 1970 and 1998 (column 1).  Relative 
to the non-respondents, the respondents are slightly younger, are more likely to be male and white, have 
slightly higher board scores (ability), and were slightly more likely to become a family practitioner and 
less likely to become a radiologist.
7  However, these differences are all small in magnitude, and the 
analysis below will control for these characteristics as well as the physicians’ own characterization of the 
shocks to their practices.  Hence, any remaining unobserved heterogeneity is unlikely to systematically 
explain our results, especially the cross-sectional results that we highlight.  Further, there is no 
statistically significant difference in expected income between respondents and non-respondents, which 
suggests that respondents do not substantially differ in unobserved ability either.  Overall, there is little 
evidence of systematic selection in the follow-up sample. 
Table 2 reports means and standard deviations for the sample of 2,350 individuals who returned 
the follow-up survey and had completed their residency training at the time of the survey.  This and 
subsequent tables exclude from the analysis the 281 respondents who were still residents and so not yet 
practicing.  As reported in the middle of Table 2, about one-third (0.366) of the practicing respondents 
believe their actual income with 10 years of experience, 20 years of experience, or their peak income was 
higher than they expected when they were a fourth-year medical student, and a similar percentage believe 
it was lower than expected.  Hence, there is substantial variation in the physicians’ subjective assessments 
 
7  Of the variables listed in Table 1, only the means for these six variables are significantly different for 11 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
of the signs of their income prediction errors.  About 20 percent of the respondents would have chosen a 
different specialty in medical school or left the medical profession entirely given what they have learned 
since graduation. 
Turning to the bottom of Table 2, a fairly large proportion of physicians have experienced 
changes in their market or have made changes to their practice that had a significant effect on their 
income (or their expected peak income).  Few of these physicians anticipated these changes when they 
were in medical school.  The second column at the bottom of the table reports the proportion of those 
experiencing a change that expected the change when they were in medical school.  For example, 51 
percent of the physicians report that demand for their services increased between the time they graduated 
from medical school and their 10
th or 20
th year of practicing, or the year in which their income peaked.  
However, only 35 percent of the physicians who experienced a demand increase anticipated this change 
when they were a fourth-year medical student.  For most physicians, therefore, the increase in demand 
can be characterized as a shock – an unforeseen event that could affect income but not expected income.  
Similarly, most of the 57 percent of physicians whose payments from insurance companies decreased 
were surprised by this change.  On the other hand, less than 10 percent of physicians report they 
significantly decreased their hours worked, but about one-third of them expected to do so. 
In the last two decades managed care health plans, such as health maintenance organizations 
(HMOs) and preferred provider organizations (PPOs), have replaced fee-for-service plans as the dominant 
form of health insurance in the United States.  We want to measure the extent to which this 
transformation of the health insurance market represented a shock to physicians’ incomes.  In 1976, less 
than three percent of the U.S. population was enrolled in an HMO.
8  Relative to a traditional fee-for-
service health plan, HMOs generally cover more health services (e.g., pharmaceuticals and preventive 
care), require patients to pay relatively less when they receive medical care, and charge a lower premium. 
 
respondents and non-respondents at the five-percent level. 12 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
  HMOs are able to offer a more comprehensive product for a lower price by restricting enrollees’ choice 
of physicians and hospitals, negotiating lower fees with physicians and hospitals included in the network, 
and more aggressively managing the care that patients receive, for example by requiring patients to 
receive permission from their primary care physician before seeing a specialist.
  HMO enrollment has 
grown rapidly over the past two decades as individuals and businesses have sought to limit the growth 
rate of health spending.  By 1999, about 30 percent of the population was enrolled in an HMO, and even 
more were enrolled in less restrictive managed care health plans such as PPOs.   
Studies have shown that HMOs reduce their enrollees’ use of hospital services and negotiate 
lower payments to hospitals for these services (Miller and Luft, 1994; Cutler, McClellan, and Newhouse, 
2000).  The evidence is mixed regarding whether HMOs increase or decrease their enrollees’ use of 
physician office visits (Miller and Luft, 1994).  Despite the widespread impression that HMOs have 
reduced physicians’ incomes, there has been little empirical evidence confirming this effect.
9  Many of the 
students in our sample graduated when HMOs were uncommon.  Suppose the Jefferson students did not 
expect HMOs, and managed care plans generally, to be as prevalent as they are. Then the physicians who 
located in areas that subsequently experienced considerable growth of HMO enrollment might earn much 
less than expected, ceteris paribus, especially in non-primary care specialties.   
We use data from Interstudy, a research organization that studies managed care health plans, to 
determine the percentage of the population in each physician’s state that was enrolled in an HMO in each 
year.  We know the state in which a respondent lived in 1998 or 1999, but do not know their residence in 
prior years.  We assume, therefore, that a physician has practiced medicine in their current state 
 
8 Based on data from Interstudy. 
9 Simon et al. (1996) find that between 1985 and 1993 primary care physicians practicing in states with 
relatively high managed care enrollment experienced relatively large income increases, whereas the opposite was 
true for hospital-based physicians (radiologists, anesthesiologists, and pathologists).  This result is consistent with 
the widely held view that primary care physicians will fare better than non-primary care physicians in a market 
dominated by managed care health plans.   13 
 
                                                
continuously since completing residency training.
10    
 
III.  Empirical Method 
We begin by formally testing whether medical students’ income expectations are unbiased and 
efficient.  Income expectations are unbiased if the mean prediction error is zero.  We compute the income 
prediction error of physician i in the j
th year after completing residency training as the difference between 
realized income (Yi,j) and expected income (EYi,j,t=0).  We test for unbiasedness by regressing this error on 
a constant:    
. u   +   α   = EY   Y      (1) 1 0 0 = t j, i, j i, −  
We convert expected and realized income to 1996 dollars using the urban consumer price index (CPI), 
and we correct the standard errors to allow for correlation in the error terms between physicians who 
received income in the same year, which allows for common shocks.  The income expectations were 
reported when the respondent was a fourth-year medical student (t=0), and actual income was reported 
retrospectively in the 1998 or 1999 follow-up survey.  The mean prediction error (α0) could be non-zero 
because of systematic shocks in the physician services market.  In this case unbiasedness might be 
rejected ex post even if students make ex ante optimal forecasts given the information that was available 
to them.  However, because our sample period is quite long, extending almost 30 years during which 
there should have been both positive and negative income shocks, the shocks should be more likely to 
average out than in previous studies of income expectations.  In any case, our data will allow us to 
characterize the sources of systematic income prediction errors. 
Income expectations are efficient if people use all of the information available to them to forecast 
their income.  Time series analyses of efficiency often test for serial correlation in prediction errors. 
 
10 Since some physicians move during their careers, our HMO enrollment variable will be measured with 
some error, which will tend to attenuate our estimates of its effects.  Polsky et al. (2000) find that between 1.5 and  
2.0 percent of physicians relocated their practice to another metropolitan area per year between 1988 and 1992. 14 
 
However, our micro data set contains few income prediction errors per physician (two or three errors for 
physicians who graduated before 1980, and only one error for the physicians who graduated after 1980).  
Therefore to test efficiency this paper instead focuses on cross-sectional variation, and looks for 
systematic demographic components in the prediction errors.  Specifically, we add to the specification 
variables Xi in physician i's information set at the time of forecast (t=0), including personal 
characteristics:  
 
. u   +     +   β   =   EY   -   Y      (2) 2 0 0 = t j, i, j i, X   β i 1  
 
If any of the β1 coefficients are non-zero, the efficiency hypothesis is rejected.   
We further examine the sources of income prediction errors by adding variables Zi,j that might 
have affected physician i’s income in year j, but were not necessarily in his information set in year zero: 
u   +     =   EY   -   Y      (3) . 0 = t j, i, j i, 3 Z   γ   +   X   γ   +   T   γ j i, 3 i 2 1  
 
 
We include a full set of year dummies (T) to identify the timing of aggregate shocks to the market for 
physician services.  Indicator variables for a physician’s specialty are included in Z  to see whether 
unexpected shocks had a different effect across specialties.  Z also contains the percentage of the 
population in physician i’s state that is enrolled in an HMO in year j.  This measure of HMO penetration 
is sometimes interacted with the set of specialty indicators because HMOs might exert a different effect 
on different specialties.  A common assumption is that by requiring patients to begin their treatment with 
a primary care physician (i.e., family practitioner, pediatrician, or a general internist) who then decides 
whether a specialist referral is necessary, HMOs would favor primary care relative to non-primary care 15 
 
physicians. 
We also include in Z the self-reported changes in a physician’s market, such as a decrease in the 
payments received from health insurance companies, and changes physicians made to their practices, such 
as decreasing the fraction of uninsured patients treated.  If medical students anticipated these market and 
practice changes when they formed their income expectations, they should not be highly correlated with 
the income prediction errors.  For each type of market or practice change, therefore, we include an 
indicator if the physician reported that the change occurred and was anticipated when the respondent was 
a fourth-year medical student, and a separate indicator if the change occurred but was not anticipated.  
Unexpected changes should be correlated more strongly with the income prediction errors than are 
expected changes. 
The prediction errors are the difference between realized and expected income.  It is sometimes 
informative to examine separately the determinants of realized income and of expected income. Since 
Nicholson and Souleles (2001) already analyzed the income expectations, we focus here on the income 
realizations.  We regress realized income in year j on a set of indicators for the year in which income was 
received (T), personal characteristics (X), and characteristics of a physician’s market and practice (Z): 
. 4 ( 4 u   +     =   Y      ) j i, Z   δ   +   X   δ   + T δ j i, 3 i 2 1  
 
 
Z includes the measure of HMO penetration and practice characteristics, such as the average number of 
hours worked per week and the proportion of patients who are uninsured.  
  Finally, we examine whether physicians alter their behavior after shocks cause their actual 
income to be different than expected, or after shocks cause physicians to revise their income predictions.  
Let Pt represent a characteristic of physician i’s practice in year t, such as the number of hours worked per 
week, the proportion of patients who are poor, or the amount of time allocated to research and teaching.  16 
 
                                                
Physicians were surveyed at time j + k (1998 or 1999) and asked to report changes they have made to 
their practice since year j, where j is either their 10
th or 20
th year of practicing medicine.  The probability 
that a physician changes a characteristic of his practice between year j and j + k is assumed to be a 
function of his income prediction error in year j, Yi,j - EYi,j,t=0,   controlling for his actual income in year j 
and personal characteristics (X):   
 
. 
To maximize sample size, for physicians whose income has not yet peaked, the dependent variable is a 
change the physician expects to make in the future and the revision in expected peak income (EYpeak,t=1999 
– EYpeak,t=0) is used instead of the prediction error.
11  A non-zero coefficient for θ1 indicates that 
physicians alter their behavior in response to unanticipated income shocks.   
 
IV.  Results 
a.  Income Prediction Errors  
Table 3 reports the average prediction error, separately for 5, 10, and 20 years of experience, and 
for physicians’ peak income if they believe their income has already peaked.  The income prediction 
errors for 5, 10, and 20 years of experience (columns 1-3) are from the students who graduated between 
1970 and 1979, whereas the peak income prediction errors (column 4) are from the students who 
graduated between 1980 and 1998.  For comparability we express all dollar values in 1996 dollars.  We 
regress a person’s income prediction error for each experience level on a constant term as described in 
equation (1).  The null hypothesis of unbiasedness is that the coefficient on the constant term (α0) is zero. 
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11 Recall that for physicians who believe their income has not yet peaked, the follow-up survey asked them 
to identify changes they expect to make in the future, and to re-forecast their peak income.  About 35 percent of the 
observations used in the results for equation (5) employ these revisions to peak income. The conclusions are 
qualitatively the same, however, without these observations.  The analyses of prediction errors using equations (1) to 
(3) do not use the revisions to expected peak income.  17 
 
α0 is positive and significantly different from zero for all four experience levels.
  Income was on 
average significantly greater than expected, especially early in physicians’ careers: α0 is $107,600 with 5 
years of experience but considerably smaller ($20,400) with 20 years of experience.  The result for peak 
income in the final column is generally consistent with the previous columns: the physicians reporting 
peak income had fewer than 16 years of experience at the time of the follow-up survey.  Therefore, it 
appears that average income prediction errors generally decline with the forecast horizon. 
The bottom panel of Table 3 presents the distribution of income prediction errors by years of 
experience.  The median physician earned $68,300 more than he or she expected after five years of 
practicing medicine, $48,900 more than expected after 10 years, and $5,900 more than expected after 20 
years of experience.  The median income prediction error for physicians whose income has already 
peaked is $51,800.  There is substantial heterogeneity in the income prediction errors.  Although the mean 
prediction error is positive for all experience levels, a considerable number of physicians earned less than 
they expected after 10 and 20 years of experience. The difference between the 75
th and 25
th percentile of 
errors is about $120,000 for 5 and 10 years of experience, and almost $150,000 for 20 years of 
experience.  Thus, although the average prediction errors decline with the forecast horizon, the cross-
sectional variance of the errors increases with horizon. 
It is possible, of course, that measurement error affects these results.  The larger errors at lower 
levels of experience could be due to recall bias that worsens with the horizon.  For example, for some 
physicians the 5
th year of experience occurred as many as 21 years before the follow-up survey.  Suppose 
that a physician who is asked to recall his income at a relatively distant point in the past reports an 
amount that is biased toward his current income, which is generally larger than the income he is recalling. 
 Such a bias could generate prediction errors that decrease with the forecast horizon.  We test this 
hypothesis by pooling the 5, 10, and 20-year prediction errors and regressing them on a constant, separate 
indicators for 5 years and 10 years of experience, and a variable measuring the number of years elapsed 18 
 
                                                
between the year of income receipt and the follow-up survey.  While the indicators for 5 and 10 years of 
experience remain significantly positive, with a larger coefficient for 5 years, the number of years elapsed 
is insignificant.
12  Thus, the large prediction errors are associated with being in the 5
th year and 10
th year 
of experience per se, even if the 5
th year and 10
th year took place relatively recently.  The prediction errors 
are not associated with the time elapsed, counter to the hypothesis of systematic recall bias.
13 
Further, the results are similar if we analyze the revision in expected peak income for physicians 
who believe their income has not yet peaked (EYpeak,t=1999  -  EYpeak,t=0).  Here the current expectation for 
peak income from the follow-up survey is not subject to recall bias.  The corresponding mean revision 
(α0) is 45.6 (standard error of 5.93), which implies that these physicians on average received good news, 
and revised up their expectations for peak income.  Furthermore, recall bias is unlikely to explain the 
systematic cross-sectional components of the prediction errors that we emphasize below.  For instance, 
there is no reason to suppose that recall bias differentially affects female versus male physicians, or 
physicians in states with high HMO enrollment versus those in states with low HMO enrollment.   
There are a number of other possible explanations for the result that the average prediction errors 
decrease with the forecast horizon.  First, it could be that shocks to the health care market 
disproportionately benefited younger physicians.  To explain the results, however, successive cohorts of 
young physicians must have received positive shocks repeatedly over the sample period.  As noted below, 
the average forecast error is positive for every cohort in the sample.
14  Second, it could be that students are 
 
12 The coefficient on the number of years elapsed is also insignificant if we also include in the regression 
prediction errors for physicians whose income has already peaked. 
13A related form of recall bias might involve money illusion.  Suppose physicians underestimated the 
amount of inflation that occurred between the year of income receipt and the follow-up survey, for example in the 
late 1970s. They might then report too large a figure for nominal income for the early part of their careers.  We test 
this hypothesis by regressing the pooled 5, 10, and 20-year prediction errors on a constant, indicators for 5 years and 
10 years of experience, and the change in the CPI between the year of income receipt and the follow-up survey.  The 
coefficient on the change in the CPI is insignificant. 
14 Souleles (2001) notes that such a result is not unlikely when the relevant “regime” is long lasting. For 
instance, he finds that low education workers continued to receive disproportionately negative shocks over the 
1980's and 1990's, perhaps due to ongoing and unexpected skill-biased technical change. As a result he concludes 
that it is very difficult to distinguish ex ante bias from ex post shocks.  Similarly, here the shocks due to different 19 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
generally better at forecasting over long rather than short horizons.  Since income shocks can be 
persistent, however, this seems unlikely.  Note that the same students are forecasting over the different 
horizons, so one cannot conclude that students are uniformly pessimistic.  Third, students might be 
relatively pessimistic regarding the beginnings of their careers.  Anecdotes suggest that many medical 
students are not fully aware of how steeply income rises early in physicians’ careers, perhaps because 
students unduly extrapolate their low incomes during the lengthy period of medical training.  Students 
might receive more accurate information regarding the income of very experienced physicians, perhaps 
because the clinical faculty who have a great deal of contact with third- and fourth-year medical students 
have considerable experience.  We further analyze this explanation below. 
To test for efficiency, we regress the income prediction errors on variables that were in students’ 
information sets when they stated their expected income, using equation (2).  Results are reported in the 
first column of Table 4.  The prediction errors for 5, 10, and 20 years of experience, and for peak income 
are pooled together, with experience and experience squared included as controls.
15  Standard errors are 
adjusted to allow for correlation within an individual across different experience levels.   
The estimated coefficients for experience are jointly significant.  The prediction errors with 5 
years and 10 years of experience are $87,000 and $76,000 larger, respectively, than the prediction errors 
for 20 years of experience, consistently with Table 3, even controlling for demographic characteristics. 
The coefficient for female physicians is significantly negative.  Nicholson and Souleles (2001) 
showed that females expected to earn less than men, controlling for a similar set of covariates.  Evidently 
their incomes turned out ex post to be even lower than expected, to a substantial degree.  The difference 
between realized and expected income was $56,700 lower, on average, for women relative to men.  Hence 
the gender gap does in fact represent a large, negative shock to women.  One explanation for this result 
 
health care regimes can also be prolonged.  
15  The results include the prediction errors for peak income for physicians whose incomes have peaked, but 
not the revisions to expectations of peak income for physicians whose incomes have not yet peaked.  Consistently 
with Table 3, more than 80 percent of the observations are prediction errors for 5, 10, and 20 years of experience 20 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
that we will examine later is that women, particularly those with young children, work fewer hours than 
men, and women might underestimate the impact of childrearing on their income when forming income 
expectations.  White physicians earned $35,000 more than they expected relative to non-white physicians, 
whereas the coefficient on ability (the board score) is not significantly different from zero. 
The three physician-specific characteristics (female, white, board score) are jointly significant.  
While these results represent a formal rejection of efficiency, one cannot conclude that students 
systematically differed in the ex ante quality of their income forecasts.  Different types of students might 
have received different shocks ex post, even on average over the long sample period.  Furthermore, these 
demographic characteristics and experience explain relatively little of the variation in income prediction 
errors between physicians; the R
2 in the first column of Table 4 is only 0.04.   
The remaining columns of Table 4 use equation (3) to further explore the sources of income 
prediction errors.  The second column includes as independent variables only experience and a full set of 
dummies for the year in which a physician received his income.  The time dummies control for aggregate 
shocks that (uniformly) affected all physicians.  The year indicator variables are jointly significant.  Thus, 
the average prediction errors vary significantly over time.  As will be discussed below, the largest income 
prediction errors occurred in the late 1980s, although on average the students earned more than they 
expected in every year.  Nonetheless, aggregate shocks explain relatively little of the variation in income 
prediction errors; the R
2 in the second column is only 0.04.   
The third column of Table 4 focuses instead on additional cross-sectional heterogeneity in 
prediction errors.  In light of the large differences in income between specialties, we replace the year 
dummies with specialty indicator variables.  Although the Jefferson alumni have generally earned more 
than they expected, there are substantial differences by specialty.  Students who entered internal medicine 
sub-specialties (e.g., cardiology or gastroenterology), radiology, anesthesiology, and surgery earned over 
 
(from the older cohorts of physicians graduating before 1980). 21 
 
                                                
$100,000 per year more than they expected, relative to students who entered family practice (the omitted 
specialty), on average.  Under the assumption that the ex ante quality of students’ forecasts do not vary 
across specialties, this suggests that different specialties received different income shocks ex post.  That 
is, there are specialty-specific shocks that the aggregate time dummies cannot soak up.  The R
2 of 0.16 
indicates that specialty-specific shocks alone explain a considerable amount of the variation across 
physicians in income prediction errors, more than year dummies and personal characteristics. 
An alternative interpretation of the difference in errors across specialties is that medical students 
are not particularly knowledgeable about physician income, and the quality of their knowledge varies 
across specialties.  However, this assessment is not consistent with the analysis by Nicholson and 
Souleles (2001).  They find that students do in part foresee future relative trends in specialty income and 
incorporate these changes into their own expectations, although not on a dollar for dollar basis.  That is, 
while their expectations are sensitive to future income trends, some of these trends are unexpected.  
Further, if the average specialty errors simply reflected differential knowledge across specialties, 
one might expect the relative errors to be rather constant over time.  However the relative errors change 
over time.  This again suggests that different specialties received different shocks over time.  To illustrate 
this result, we group the specialties into two categories: non-primary care physicians (surgeons, 
radiologists, internal medicine sub-specialists, obstetricians, pathologists, psychiatrists, and 
anesthesiologists) and primary care physicians (family practitioners, internists, and pediatricians).  We 
then interact the year indicators (as in the second column of Table 4) with an indicator that equals one for 
the non-primary care physicians.  The interaction terms are jointly significant and their inclusion 
increases the R
2 from 0.04 in column 2 to 0.09 (not reported).    
In Figure 1 we plot the mean income prediction error over time, separately for primary and non-
primary care physicians.  To increase precision, the time dummies refer to two-year increments.
16  For 
 
16 The underlying specification omits the constant term.   22 
 
                                                
primary care physicians the mean income prediction error is always positive, and significantly different 
from zero at the five-percent level for every time period.  Relative to primary care physicians, non-
primary care physicians’ income was much larger than expected, especially so in the late 1980s.
17 
The gap between the lines in Figure 1 characterizes the relative shock to non-primary care versus 
primary care physicians.  Even if recall bias or other measurement issues affect the overall sample 
average prediction error, they are unlikely to explain the fluctuations in this gap.  The fluctuations in 
relative errors are indicative of time-varying, specialty-specific shocks.  The relative positive shock to 
non-primary care income in the 1980s might be due in part to new medical technologies (e.g., MRI, 
arthroscopic surgery, laparascopic surgery, and angioplasty) that increased the demand for specialist 
services.
18  The relative negative shock to non-primary care physicians that occurred in the early 1990s 
could be due to the influence of managed care health plans on the physician services market and the 1992 
revision to the Medicare fee schedule that favored primary care physicians.  We will further examine 
these shocks below. 
These results have important methodological implications for rational expectations (or forward-
looking) models.  Empirical implementations of such models usually rely on time dummies to soak up all 
systematic components of prediction errors, assuming that aggregate shocks hit all people uniformly.
19  
However, our results suggest that time-varying, group-specific shocks, which are not captured by time 
dummies, are also important.  Empirical models need to account for such systematic heterogeneity in 
prediction errors.  
The final column of Table 4 includes year indicators, specialty indicators, and personal 
 
17  The non-primary care - year interactions are always positive, and significant at at least the 10-percent 
level for every 2-year bin in the sample period. 
18 Because of entry barriers in the non-primary care specialties, these technology shocks were not fully 
offset by more residents switching into non-primary care.  Many medical students who tried to obtain residency 
positions in orthopedic surgery, surgery, radiology, and obstetrics in the 1980s were unsuccessful (Nicholson, 2001). 
19 In many empirical specifications the prediction errors are relegated to the residual term and assumed to be 
classical.  However, if the prediction errors are systematic (e.g., they are correlated with basic demographic 
characteristics), they are likely to be correlated with some of the regressors of interest, resulting in biased estimates. 23 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
characteristics.  These variables collectively explain 19 percent of the variation in income prediction 
errors. This R
2 is large considering that classical income prediction errors should be white noise.  
Evidently prediction errors are not as classical as usually assumed.  Controlling for specialty and year, 
women still earned less than they expected relative to men, as did non-whites. 
  
b.  Income Realizations 
Nicholson and Souleles (2001) already analyzed one component of the income prediction errors, 
the income expectations.  Here we analyze the other component -- the income realizations elicited in the 
follow-up surveys.  Although there are up to four separate income observations for each respondent, 
information on the characteristics of their practice is available only for the time of the follow-up survey, 
either in 1998 or 1999.
20    We therefore perform two separate regressions, both following equation (4).  
First, we pool the multiple income observations for each respondent and regress them on personal 
characteristics, including experience, market characteristics (e.g., HMO penetration over time), and 
specialty indicators.  In this specification the standard errors are adjusted to allow for correlation in the 
error terms between the multiple observations for an individual.  HMO penetration is interacted with the 
specialty indicators to allow the effects of HMOs to vary across specialties.  Second, we regress a 
physician’s income in 1997 or 1998 on personal characteristics, specialty indicators, as well as 
contemporaneous practice characteristics (in 1998 or 1999). 
The results of the first regression with multiple income observations over physicians’ careers are 
reported in the first column of Table 5.  Controlling for specialty and ability, as measured by the board 
 
See Souleles (2001) for a discussion.   
20 Recall that the first follow-up survey (in 1998) was sent to students who graduated from medical school 
between 1970 and 1979.  Among this group, physicians who had been practicing medicine for fewer than 20 years 
were asked their income with 5 years of experience, 10 years of experience, and for 1997 (the most current complete 
year at the time of the survey).  Physicians who had been practicing medicine for 20 or more years were also asked 
their income with 20 years of experience.  The second follow-up survey (in 1999) was sent to students who 
graduated between 1980 and 1998.  These physicians were asked to report their income in 1998 (the most current 
complete year), 1992, and their peak income if they believed their income had already peaked.  24 
 
                                                
score, women earned $59,600 less, on average, than men.  The estimated coefficients for experience and 
experience squared, which are jointly significant, imply that annual practice income increased by $43,000 
(in real dollars) in the first five years of a physician’s career, increased by $24,000 between the fifth and 
10
th year of experience, and decreased by $9,000 between the 10
th and 20
th years of experience.  That is, 
the experience-income profile is quite steep at low levels of experience and peaks before 20 years of 
experience.  As suggested above, medical students might not be fully aware of the initial steepness of the 
experience-income profile. 
The uninteracted variable for HMO penetration, corresponding to family practice, is insignificant. 
The HMO-specialty interactions, however, are statistically significant for several non-primary care 
specialties.
21  Relative to family practice, specialists in fields like internal medicine sub-specialties, 
surgery, ob/gyn, and anesthesiology in states with high levels of HMO activity earn significantly less than 
comparable physicians practicing in those specialties in states where HMOs are less prominent.  These 
effects are also economically significant. For example, a cardiologist in a state where 20.9 percent of the 
population is enrolled in an HMO (the mean value for the physicians in the sample) is predicted to earn 
$33,400 less per year than an otherwise similar cardiologist practicing in a state where only 11.2 percent 
of the population is enrolled in an HMO (one standard deviation lower than the mean). 
HMO enrollment has grown rapidly in the United States, especially between 1992 and 1998 when 
enrollment grew at an average rate of 12.4 percent per year.  The growth of HMOs could constitute the 
negative shock experienced by non-primary care physicians relative to primary care physicians in the 
1990s that is illustrated in Figure 1.  After 1993 the relative income prediction errors for non-primary care 
physicians relative to primary care physicians began to decline.  
  The second regression specification in Table 5, reported in the third and fourth columns, includes 
the contemporaneous practice characteristics.  Even when one controls for practice characteristics, 
 
21  The HMO penetration variable and the HMO-specialty interactions are jointly significant in Table 5. 25 
 
including average hours worked per week, women were earning substantially less than men in 1997/1998. 
The coefficient estimate on the board score is not statistically significant.  Part of the explanation is that 
some students with relatively high board scores take academic positions, which pay less within each 
specialty.  Also, students with high board scores are more likely to enter high-paying specialties 
(Arcidiacono and Nicholson, 2001), so some of the returns to ability will be captured by the specialty 
indicator coefficients.  There are large income differences by specialty.  Internal medicine sub-specialists, 
for example, earned an average of $303,000 per year more than family practitioners. (For brevity, the 
coefficients on the specialty indicators are not reported in Table 5). 
  Most of the practice characteristic coefficients are statistically and economically significant.  
Physicians who work long hours, have a relatively small proportion of poor patients, are in a group 
practice, and are not employed by the government have greater income relative to other physicians.  For 
example, a physician who works 65 hours per week and has a practice where 10 percent of the patients 
are poor (Medicaid insurance or uninsured) has a predicted income that is $21,000 higher than a 
comparable physician who works a total of 55 hours per week and has a practice where 20 percent of the 
patients are poor.  
 
c. Shocks to Physician Practices and Markets 
  To test the extent to which medical students anticipated the impact of HMOs when they formed 
their income expectations, we add the HMO penetration variable and HMO-specialty interaction variables 
as explanatory variables to the analysis of prediction errors.  As in the fourth column of Table 4, income 
prediction errors across physicians’ careers are pooled, and personal characteristics, specialty indicators, 
and year indicators are included.  The results are reported in Table 6.  Income prediction errors in internal 
medicine, internal medicine sub-specialties, surgery, ob/gyn, anesthesiology, and radiology were more 
than $70,000 larger, on average, than in family practice.  However, for four of these specialties (internal 26 
 
                                                
medicine, surgery, ob/gyn, anesthesiology) as well as psychiatry, the coefficient for the HMO-specialty 
interaction is negative and significant.
22  A surgeon in a market with the mean amount of HMO activity 
(20.9 percent of the population enrolled in an HMO) earned an estimated $111,500 more than he expected 
with 10 years of experience, whereas an otherwise equivalent surgeon in a market where HMOs are more 
prevalent (31.6 percent of the population enrolled in an HMO, or one standard deviation higher than the 
mean) earned only $62,000 more than he expected.  Thus differences in HMO activity across markets 
explain a fairly substantial amount of the variation in income prediction errors for surgeons and other 
non-primary care physicians.  That is, the growth of HMOs represented a large and unexpected shock to 
specialist physicians. 
  Of course HMOs represent only one of many possible shocks that could explain why the mean 
income prediction error is positive and why there is considerable variation in prediction errors across 
physicians.  The Jefferson follow-up survey contains a unique catalogue of possible shocks.  We asked 
respondents to identify specific market and practice changes that occurred since they formed their income 
expectations at the end of medical school (t=0), and to indicate which changes were unanticipated and 
therefore not a part of the respondent’s information set at the time of the forecasts.  The income prediction 
errors should be more strongly correlated with unanticipated changes than with anticipated changes.  
Unanticipated market and practice changes can also be viewed as revisions to a respondent’s information 
set, and could cause a respondent to revise his expected income.  In the follow-up survey we also asked 
physicians whose income had not yet peaked to re-forecast their peak income.  Therefore, we also test 
whether unanticipated market and practice changes are associated with changes in a physician’s 
expectations regarding peak income. 
To maximize the sample size, Table 7 pools the variables for the income prediction error in year j 
(Yj – EYj,t=0) and the change in expected peak income between medical school and year j (EYpeak,t=1999 – 
 
22 The HMO variable and the HMO-specialty interaction terms are jointly significant. 27 
 
EYpeak,t=0).  The independent variables include information that was available to the respondents in their 
fourth year of medical school (female, white, and board score, as in Table 4).  We also include separate 
indicator variables for anticipated and unanticipated changes that occurred between the time of the 
income forecast and its realization, or between the first and second prediction for peak income (i.e., 
between t=0 and t=j).  Year j for the income prediction errors is either the 10
th year of practicing 
medicine, the 20
th year of practicing medicine, or the year in which a respondent’s income peaked.  For 
physicians whose income has not yet peaked, year j is 1999.  For brevity, the coefficient estimates for 
changes that occurred and were unanticipated are reported in the third column.  We include year indicator 
variables to control for aggregate shocks, but not specialty indicators.  If the incidence of market changes 
varied between specialties, the specialty indicators would capture some of the cross-sectional impact of 
the market changes on income prediction errors.  
Ten of the 16 unanticipated market and practice changes are statistically significant at the 5 or 10 
percent level, and some have had an economically significant effect on physicians’ income prediction 
errors (or revisions to expected peak income).  Starting in the middle of Table 7, physicians who indicated 
when they were a fourth-year medical student that they were planning to enter a relatively low-paying 
specialty (family practice, pediatrics, and psychiatry) but now report to be practicing in a relatively high-
income specialty (internal medicine sub-specialty, surgery, ob/gyn, anesthesiology, and radiology) earned 
$146,000 more than they expected (or revised their expected peak income upwards by $146,000), on 
average, relative to physicians who are practicing in their expected specialty.  Conversely, physicians who 
have switched from a high- to a low-paying specialty had income prediction errors that were $109,000 
lower than otherwise similar physicians.  Hence changes in specialty are associated with large income 
prediction errors. 
Physicians practicing in a market where the demand for their services increased or the payments 
from health insurers increased each earned about $29,000 more than expected, relative to all other 28 
 
physicians.  Physicians who accepted more uninsured and poor patients than they expected earned 
$30,000 less than expected; physicians who took a salaried position (e.g., with an HMO) earned $27,000 
less than expected; and physicians who accepted more capitated contracts (providing fixed payment 
regardless of the amount of services rendered to a patient) than expected earned $20,000 less than they 
expected.   
Two of the coefficients on the unexpected change variables have a surprising sign.  Physicians 
that experienced unexpected decreases in their payments from health insurance companies have relatively 
large prediction errors and physicians who accepted fewer poor patients have relatively small prediction 
errors.  One explanation for these results is that there could have been both positive and negative shocks 
in the interval between the time of forecast and income receipt, but physicians might be reporting only the 
more recent shock.  For example, suppose a large increase in health insurance payments was followed by 
a small reduction in reimbursement.  The physician might report on the follow-up survey that 
reimbursement levels decreased.  Similarly, in response to a negative income shock a physician may have 
accepted fewer poor patients.  Nonetheless, the bulk of the unanticipated shocks have the expected effect. 
Only two of the 14 coefficients on the market and practice changes that were anticipated by 
medical students when they formed their income predictions are significant.  Physicians who experienced 
an anticipated increase in the demand for their services earned an average of $30,700 more than they 
expected, relative to other physicians; and physicians who took a salaried position, and expected to do so, 
earned $42,600 less than expected.  Note, however, that the follow-up survey only asked physicians to 
indicate if a market or practice change that occurred was expected, not whether that change had a larger 
or smaller impact on their income than expected.  One explanation for these two coefficients is that the 
change in general was qualitatively expected, but its magnitude or quantitative impact on income was 
partly unanticipated.  Overall, these results vividly illustrate the pervasiveness and economic significance 29 
 
                                                
of shocks to physicians’ practices.
23   
 
d. Impact of Income Shocks on Behavior 
Our analysis so far has focused on the sources of income prediction errors.  To further document 
the economic significance of prediction errors, and the usefulness of the underlying expectations 
variables, we now examine whether the errors affect subsequent behavior.
24  The 1998 follow-up survey 
asked physicians to identify changes they have made to their practices since their 20
th or 10
th year of 
practicing medicine, depending on whether the respondent had been practicing for more than or fewer 
than 20 years, respectively. Since Jefferson graduates after 1979 reported only their expected peak 
income, the 1999 follow-up survey asked physicians to identify changes they made to their practice either 
since their income peaked or changes they expect to make in the future if they believe their income has 
not yet peaked.  These questions allow us to examine whether and how physicians altered their behavior 
in response to shocks they faced over their careers, as measured by the income prediction errors and 
revisions in expected peak income, again pooled.   
We examine three possible changes a physician could make to his practice:  a change in the 
number of hours worked per week, a change in the percent of time devoted to teaching and research (non-
patient activities), and a change in the number of Medicaid and uninsured patients treated.  For each 
potential change, respondents could indicate an increase (coded as 1), a decrease (coded as –1), or no 
change (coded as 0).  Following equation (5), we relate the practice changes since year j (Pi,t+k – Pi,j) to 
personal characteristics, including the physician’s age at the time of the follow-up survey, his income in 
year j (Yj), and his income prediction error in year j, Yj – EYj,t=0 (or the change in expected peak income : 
 
23 The results are qualitatively similar if we exclude the revisions to expected peak income and examine 
only income prediction errors in Table 7.   
24 Recall that Nicholson and Souleles (2001) found that the expectations variables were significant in 
forecasting the students’ specialty choices. 30 
 
                                                
EYpeak,t=1999 – EYpeak,t=0).
25  The subscript j refers to the year when the physician has 10 years of 
experience, 20 years of experience, or the year in which his income peaked.   
Physicians were also asked to predict their retirement age and whether, with hindsight, they 
would have chosen the same specialty in medical school, selected a different specialty, or would have left 
the medical profession altogether.  The retirement age is continuous but top-coded at 75 years of age.
26  
Respondents who indicate they would have chosen a different specialty or left medicine altogether are 
coded as one; those who would remain in their specialty are coded as zero.   
The income prediction errors and revisions in predicted income are likely to be measured with 
error, which would tend to bias the coefficient on the prediction error toward zero.  In the reported results 
we therefore estimate equation (5) using two-stage least squares.  We instrument for the constructed 
income prediction errors (Yj-EYj,t=0) using a physician’s subjective assessment in 1998 or 1999 regarding 
whether his income with 10 or 20 years of experience, his peak income, or his current expectations for 
peak income is higher, lower, or about the same as  he expected when he was a fourth-year medical 
student.  We create two indicator variables for people who believe their actual income (or current 
expected peak income) is higher than initially expected, or lower than initially expected.  Physicians’ 
subjective assessments of their income prediction errors perform quite well as instruments for the 
constructed prediction errors.  The first-stage coefficient on the indicator for actual income (or current 
expected peak income) being higher than initially expected is $26,600 (standard error of $7,100), and the 
coefficient on the indicator for income being lower than initially expected is -$16,200 (standard error of 
$7,000), and the two coefficients are jointly very significant.  These strong first-stage results reinforce our 
confidence in the quality of the expectations data.   
Table 8 reports the results. The instrumented prediction error is negative and significant in three 
 
25  Age and experience are highly correlated because most students are close to 22 years of age when they 
matriculate. 
26 The expected retirement age is the only one of these five variables that is not measured as a change 
because we do not observe the age at which a respondent expected to retire when he was a medical student. 31 
 
                                                
of the five regressions.  Physicians who earned less than they expected in year j were more likely to 
respond by increasing their hours worked after year j (column 1), increasing the percentage of their time 
devoted to treating patients as opposed to alternatives like research and teaching (column 2), and 
reporting that with hindsight they would have chosen a different specialty or left the medical profession 
altogether (column 5).  These responses to unanticipated shocks are intuitive.  Physicians who 
experienced positive shocks consumed more leisure, spent more time on lower-paying but perhaps more 





Income expectations play a central role in many economic decisions.  However, because 
economists cannot usually directly observe income expectations, they have received little study.  In this 
paper we use a unique panel data set recording physician income expectations and realizations to examine 
the accuracy of income expectations, the sources of income prediction errors, and the effect of these 
errors on subsequent physician behavior.  We find that medical students made systematic income 
prediction errors, even over a long (28-year) sample period.  Unlike most previous studies, the data set is 
rich enough to identify the sources of the prediction errors.  We trace a large part of the errors to time-
varying specialty-specific shocks.  These shocks, as well as other systematic demographic components of 
the errors, call into question the common assumption that aggregate shocks affect people uniformly.  
More generally, empirical implementations of forward-looking models need to better account for 
 
27 In unreported regressions we have also estimated equation (5) non-linearly, using the constructed income 
prediction errors (Yj-EYj,t=0) without instrumenting for the errors as in Table 8.  We estimate the practice change 
specifications (columns 1-3 of Table 8) using an ordered probit since the dependent variables are trichotomous and 
ordered; we estimate the specification for retirement age by ordinary least squares and the specification for selecting 
a different specialty or leaving medicine with a probit equation.  In two of the five regressions the coefficient on the 
prediction error (or change in predicted peak income) is significant.  Physicians who earned less than they expected 
in year j report a relatively low expected retirement age and are more likely to report that with hindsight they would 
have chosen a different specialty or left the medical profession altogether.   32 
 
systematic heterogeneity in shocks and prediction errors.  
The data set includes a thorough description of the shocks to physicians’ practices and markets. 
We find that market changes that were unanticipated by a medical student when he formed his income 
expectations, such as an unexpected increase in demand for physician services, help explain much of the 
variation in income prediction errors across physicians.  For example, specialist, non-primary care 
physicians practicing in markets with relatively high HMO enrollment earned substantially less than they 
expected, compared to specialists in markets with low HMO enrollment.  We also find that income 
prediction errors substantially alter subsequent physician behavior.  Physicians who experienced negative 
income shocks were more likely to respond by increasing their hours worked, allocating fewer of their 
work hours to teaching/research and more to patient care, and were more likely to switch specialties.  
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Sample Means and Standard Deviations From Fourth-year Medical Student Surveys 
 
 
All Jefferson   
Students  
(n=5,995)   Completed Follow-up Survey (n=2,631) 
Mean   Mean        Std. Deviation 
              
 
Age  at  graduation       26.8     26.6      2.83 
Female       0.236   0.231    0.422 
White       0.875   0.900    0.299 
Part 1 NBME board exam score     204.2    205.1       17.1 
Expected income, in 1996 dollars ($000)     
   - 5 years of experience: EY5,t=0        97.6      95.0        46.2 
   - 10 years of experience: EY10,t=0   148.9   148.8        81.5   
   - 20 years of experience: EY20,t=0   184.2   184.1        85.7   
   - peak income: EYpeak,t=0    183.1   185.4    113.1   
Expected specialty  
      -  internal  medicine     0.232   0.225    0.418 
      -  family  practice     0.144   0.163    0.370 
      -  pediatrics      0.061   0.068    0.252 
      -  surgery      0.223   0.233    0.423 
      -  ob/gyn      0.054   0.056    0.230 
      -  psychiatry      0.031   0.032    0.177 
      -  anesthesiology     0.027   0.023    0.151 
      -  radiology      0.036   0.029    0.168 
      -  other     0.192   0.170    0.376 
 
 Notes:  Jefferson medical students were asked during their fourth year (t=0) to predict their income EYj, 
t=0 from medical practice with j= 5, 10, and 20 years of experience after completing residency training, as 
well as the peak income in their careers.  (Students who graduated after 1979 were asked to predict only 
their peak income, not their income 5, 10, and 20 years after completing residency training.  Sample 
means for the latter variables reflect the responses from students who graduated before 1980 only.)  
Column 1 includes all students who graduated from Jefferson Medical College between 1970 and 1998.  
Column 2 and column 3 include the subset of students who responded to the 1998 or 1999 follow-up 
surveys that recorded the corresponding income realizations.  36 
 
Table 2 
Sample Means and Standard Deviations from the 1998 and 1999 Follow-Up Surveys 
 
 
       M e a n        Std. Deviation 
Practice/market characteristics (t=1998/99) 
      -  solo  practice       0.118   0.323   
- hours worked per week        56.1    14.6 
-  teach  10+  hours/week     0.220   0.414 
Percent of state residents enrolled in an HMO    20.9    10.7 
Actual income from medical practice (1996 $000): 
   - 5 years of experience: Y5     200.8   152.1    
   - 10 years of experience: Y10     238.5   177.0   
   - 20 years of experience: Y20     220.2   135.6 
   - current (1997 or 1998) income      194.4    125.6     
- peak income, if income has peaked: Ypeak   259.0   183.1 
Expected peak income, if income has       238.3    173.4 
  has not yet peaked: EYpeak, t=1998/9 
Expected  retirement  age      61.9   7.76 
Respondents’ subjective assessment of Y10, Y20, 
   or Ypeak relative to EY10,t=0, EY20,t=0, or EYpeak,t=0: 
      - actual income higher than expected     0.366    0.482 
      - actual income about same as expected    0.296    0.456 
      - actual income lower than expected     0.338    0.473 
  
W/ hindsight, respondent would have chosen a    0.196    0.397 
   different specialty in medical school or left 
   medicine altogether              Respondent expected the      
         Change    change, conditional        
Market/practice changes that occurred during          occurred    on its occurrence             
first 10 or 20 years of practicing medicine: 
   - demand for MD services increased      0.511      0.346     
   - demand for their services decreased       0.096      0.149     
   - payments from insurance companies increased    0.143      0.335     
   - payments from insurance companies decreased    0.572      0.231     
   - increase in utilization management  by insurers    0.300      0.137     
   - MD accepted more uninsured/Medicaid patients    0.154      0.212     
   - MD accepted fewer uninsured/Medicaid patients    0.075      0.120       
   - MD accepted more capitated contracts      0.326      0.202     
   - MD switched specialties        0.043      0.073      
   - MD switched to a different practice      0.206      0.187     
   - MD took a salaried position        0.111      0.121       
   - MD increased work hours        0.344      0.255     
   - MD decreased work hours          0.089      0.323     
   - MD allocated more time to seeing patients    0.168      0.157     
   - MD allocated more time to non-patient activities    0.099      0.154 
 
Notes: N=2,350. The follow-up surveys in 1998 and 1999 elicited income realizations Yj at j years of experience 
corresponding to the income expectations asked during medical school (t=0), in current dollars, including peak 
career income if their income has already peaked.  (If income has yet to peak, students were asked to re-forecast 37 
 
their peak career income, EYpeak, t=1998/9.)  Students were also asked to subjectively assess whether their income 
turned out higher or lower than they expected when they were a fourth-year medical student.  This question refers to 
income at the 20
th year of experience for physicians with at least 20 years of experience; otherwise it refers to 
income at the 10
th year of experience.  Students also catalogued the changes to their practices and markets that 
occurred during the first 10 years of practice (20 years for the older physicians), and whether they had expected 
these changes as of the 4
th year of medical school.  The sample includes only graduates who were practicing 
medicine at the time of the survey (excluding residents). 
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Table 3:  Income Prediction Errors With 5, 10, and 20 Years of Experience, and for Peak Income 
 
Panel A: Average Income Prediction Errors (1996 $000) 
 
                                        Graduated 1970-1979             Graduated 1980-1998 
 
Dependent variable:    Y5 - EY5,t=0   Y 10 - EY10,t=0   Y 20 - EY20,t=0   Ypeak  – EYpeak,t=0 
 
mean (α0)        107.6**        92.5**        20.4**           78.7** 
 
S.E.          (7.12)         (6.04)        (7.64)           (11.8) 
 
Observations         762           753          246              380 
 
Panel B: Distribution of Income Prediction Errors (1996 $000) 
 
Percentile     Y 5 - EY5,t=0   Y 10 - EY10,t=0   Y 20 - EY20,t=0   Ypeak  – EYpeak,t=0      
 
10
th          -16.2        -50.9      -137.4            -42.4 
 
25
th           20.9          -4.7        -77.4             -0.2 
 
Median             68.3          48.9           5.9             51.8 
 
75
th         145.6        137.0         74.1           133.4 
 
90
th       259.2        294.1      202.3              254.6 
 
Notes:  Income prediction errors are constructed as the difference between actual income Yj with j years of experience (from the follow-up survey) and the 
corresponding expected income EYj,t=0 for year j, as forecasted in the fourth year of medical school (t=0).  Expected and realized incomes are converted to 1996 
dollars using the consumer price index.  Since 1980, the medical school survey asks students to predict only their peak income; before 1980, it also asked for 
predictions with j=5, 10, and 20 years of experience.  Panel A estimates the average forecast error using equation (1), by regressing the errors on a constant α0.  
The standard errors are adjusted to allow for correlation between physicians according to the year in which income was received.  ** = significantly different 
from zero at the five-percent level.   39 
 
Table 4 
Determinants of Income Prediction Errors 
 
        (1)      (2)               (3)       (4) 
   Personal     Year          Specialty        Specialty, Year, & 
 Characteristics       Controls         Controls       Personal Characteristics 
Female     -56.7**       -45.3** 
    ( 9 . 7 4 )        ( 1 0 . 2 )  
White       34.5*         39.4** 
    (18.9)       (17.2) 
Board  score    -0.0718       -0.252 
    (0.249)       (0.235) 
Experience      3.26     0.214     5.20**     2.63 
    (2.09)   (2.56)   (2.09)   (2.55) 
Experience  squared    -0.363** -0.277** -0.420** -0.309** 
    (0.089)   (0.103)   (0.088)   (0.101) 
 
Indicators for year          Not included         Jointly sig.      Not included      Jointly significant 
  income received           
 
Specialty indicators (family practice omitted) 
   - internal medicine               45.9**    40.8** 
        ( 8 . 9 5 )    ( 9 . 2 5 )  
 - internal medicine sub-specialties         205**     198** 
        (27.0)   (25.9) 
-  pediatrics          20.2**     19.1** 
(8.93) (9.39) 
-  surgery          118**     108** 
        (14.2)   (14.4) 
-  ob/gyn          97.5**     95.3** 
(16.5) (16.9) 
-  psychiatry        -9.96   -22.9* 
(12.7) (13.5) 
-  anesthesiology         149**     148** 
        (27.0)   (27.4) 
-  radiology          141**     134** 
        (16.6)   (15.8) 
      -  pathology          26.1**     18.0 
(13.3) (14.0) 
      -  other         59.5**     54.9** 
        (17.2)   (17.6) 
Constant      84.8     70.9**     12.3     40.2 
    (52.2)   (19.0)   (11.3)   (51.5) 
 
Observations      2,117     2,117       2,117   2,117 
R
2            0.04      0.04      0.16     0.19 
 
Notes:  This table tests for systematic components in the income prediction errors, following equations (2) and (3).  
The dependent variable is the difference between realized and expected income, Yj – EYj,t=0 in year j.  Observations 40 
 
are pooled for j= 5, 10, and 20 years of experience and for peak career income.  Family practice is the omitted 
specialty in columns (3) and (4).  Standard errors are corrected to allow the error terms to be correlated for an 
individual throughout his career.   ** = significantly different from zero at the 5-percent level; * = significantly 
different from zero at the 10-percent level.   41 
 
Table 5 
Determinants of Physicians’ Income 
 
Pooled Observations        1997 or 1998 Income    
 
         Coefficient S.E.           Coefficient S.E 
 
Female      -59.6**   5.46   -32.8**   5.16 
White        10.6   8.52   -0.107   8.49 
Board  score     -0.252   0.156   -0.080   0.182 
Experience       10.4**   1.19     9.46**   1.45 
Experience  squared    -0.378**  0.058   -0.273**  0.066 
Percentage of population     0.176    0.442  
   enrolled in HMO 
 
HMO * specialty indicators (family practice omitted) 
   - internal medicine        -0.994**  0.418      
   - internal medicine sub-specialists  -3.12**   1.21 
   - pediatrics         0.276    0.488      
      -  surgery     -1.79**   0.687      
      -  ob/gyn     -1.75**   0.747      
      -  psych     -0.663   0.498      
   - anesthesiology      -3.13**   0.994      
      -  radiology     -0.048   0.811      
-  pathology       0.023   0.726 
-  other    -0.629   0.744 
 
Practice characteristics (1998 or 1999) 
      -  hours  worked/week          1.63**   0.220    
   - poor patients as % of total            -0.440**  0.110 
   - > 9 hours/week on teaching/research          75.5     76.0 
   - board score * teach > 9 hours          -0.477    0.363 
      -  solo  practice         -13.4     9.63 
   - employed by government            -48.5**    7.12 
 
Constant       159**   35.4     22.0   38.9           
       
Observations      4,837     1,806 
R
2         0.27       0.30 
 
Notes:  The dependent variable is ex post income received in year j, Yij, following equation (4).  In the first 
specification, j is the year in which a physician had 5, 10, and 20 years of experience, and the year in which a 
physician’s income peaked, pooled together. The standard errors are corrected to allow the errors to be correlated for 
a physician throughout his career.  The second specification uses income only from 1997 and 1998, the year before 
the follow-up survey, and includes contemporaneous practice characteristics as of the follow-up survey.   Indicator 
variables for a respondent’s specialty and the year in which he received their income are included in the both 
specifications.  ** = significantly different from zero at the 5-percent level; * = significantly different from zero at 
the 10-percent level.  42 
 
Table 6:  Effect of HMOs on Income Prediction Errors  
       
Coefficient S.E.      
   
Female       -47.3**   10.2    
White         40.7**   18.1 
Board  score      -0.219   0.236   
Experience        2.33   2.60 
Experience  squared     -0.300**  0.102 
 
Specialty indicators (family practice omitted) 
   - internal medicine         71.9**   15.4 
   - internal medicine sub-specialist     220**    42.9           
      -  pediatrics        20.3   16.9       
      -  surgery        177**   23.9       
      -  ob/gyn        142**   28.6       
      -  psychiatry        31.0   25.4       
      -  anesthesiology       201**   44.6       
      -  radiology        120**   25.4       
   - pathology           35.4    22.9 
   - other           85.8**   31.0 
    
Percentage of state population       0.574    0.805 
   enrolled in an HMO   
 
HMO * specialty interactions (family practice omitted) 
   - internal medicine        -2.02**   0.722 
   - internal medicine sub-specialist    -1.51    2.06           
      -  pediatrics        0.145   0.809       
      -  surgery      -4.63**   1.09       
      -  ob/gyn      -3.08*   1.58       
      -  psychiatry      -3.60*   1.81       
      -  anesthesiology     -3.49**   1.54       
      -  radiology        0.985   1.27       
      -  pathology      -1.05   1.02 
      -  other     -2.10**   1.11 
   
Constant        30.0   55.5   
     
Observations       2,101 
R
2                0 . 2 0        
        
Notes:  This table tests for systematic components in the income prediction errors, following equations (2) and (3), 
focusing on the effect of the growth in health maintenance organization (HMO) enrollment.  The dependent variable 
is the difference between realized and expected income, Yj – EYj,t=0 in year j.  Observations are pooled for j= 5, 10, 
and 20 years of experience and for peak career income.  Family practice is the omitted specialty.  Indicator variables 
are included for the year in which income was received.  Standard errors are corrected to allow the errors to be 
correlated for a physician throughout his career.  ** = significantly different from zero at the 5-percent level; * = 
significantly different from zero at the 10-percent level. 43 
 
Table 7 
 Impact of Market and Practice Changes on Income Prediction Errors 
 
Anticipated at t=0    Unanticipated at t=0 
 
Market and practice changes:      Coefficient S.E.   Coefficient S.E. 
 
Demand for MD’s services increased     30.7**   11.0     29.0**   9.39 
Demand for MD’s services decreased      13.2    25.3     2.77    19.8   
Payments from insurance companies increased   21.3    21.0     28.7**   14.4 
Payments from insurance companies decreased   15.6    16.5     29.0**   9.76   
Increase in utilization mgmt by insurers     3.23    23.1    -5.83    9.70   
MD accepted more uninsured/Medicaid pts  -39.9    28.1    -29.9**   10.9   
MD accepted fewer uninsured/Medicaid pts  -67.9    68.4    -43.0**   17.9 
MD accepted more capitated contracts    -5.00    17.3    -19.9**   9.68   
MD  switched  to  higher-paying  specialty         146**   40.3 
MD  switched  to  lower-paying  specialty       -109**   26.9     
MD switched to a different practice    -0.218    19.9     6.11    10.3   
MD  took  a  salaried  position    -42.6**   17.8   -27.3**   9.25   
MD increased work hours       10.3    15.1     16.3*    8.84 
MD decreased work hours       14.3    20.1     4.03    20.3 
MD allocated more time to seeing pts     50.0    33.7     1.29    9.84 
MD allocated more time to non-pt activities  -16.7   18.1   -19.4   12.1 
  
Female       -25.9**   9.64 
 
White         12.3   16.1 
     
Board  score      -0.288   0.242 
    
Experience      -4.10   3.08 
            
Experience  squared       0.055   0.103 
 
Constant          144**   51.6       
 
Observations       1,660       
R
2                0 . 0 8        
       
Notes:  This table analyzes the effect on income prediction errors of various changes in physician markets and 
practices, following equation (3).  The dependent variable is the income prediction error in year j: Yj - EYj,t=0. 
Observations are pooled for j = 10 years of experience, 20 years of experience, or the year in which a person’s 
income reached its peak.  (For physicians whose income has not yet peaked, the dependent variable is the change 
between 1999 and the 4
th year of medical school (t=0) in the person’s expectation for peak income: EYpeak,t=1999  - 
EYpeak,t=0).   Each market and practice change is interacted with an indicator for whether the change was anticipated 
as of t=0.  The anticipated and unanticipated changes are both included as independent variables in a single 
regression; the unanticipated changes are listed in the third column for clarity.  Indicator variables are included for 
the year in which a physician received his income.  ** = significantly different from zero at the 5-percent level;  
* = significantly different from zero at the 10-percent level. 44 
 
Table 8 
Effect of Income Prediction Errors on Behavior   
 
      Change  in  %   Change  in  #              w/ hindsight, MD would 
    Change  in    of  time  devoted   of  Medicaid/      Expected         have chosen a different 
Dependent variable:    hrs. worked to  patients   poor  patients   retirement  age         specialty in med school 
 
Income prediction error   -0.0044**       -0.0014*      -0.0001     0.0054             -0.0022** 
   (Yj - EYj,t=0)     (0.0013)       (0.0007)      (0.0007)    (0.0097)            (0.0008) 
 
Income, Yt=j       0.0039**       0.0013**       0.0001    -0.0097              0.0013** 
        (0.0011)      (0.0007)      (0.0006)    (0.0085)            (0.0006) 
 
Female        0.0304         0.0160       0.0322    -2.15**              0.0830* 
        (0.0734)       (0.0438)      (0.0375)    (0.578)             (0.0467) 
 
White        -0.0351         0.0705      -0.0212     0.505               0.0292 
        (0.0955)       (0.0570)      (0.0488)    (0.752)             (0.0564) 
Age        -0.0093       -0.0098**      -0.0032     0.353**             0.0030 
        (0.0057)      (0.0034)      (0.0029)    (0.0447)            (0.0042) 
Constant      -0.221          0.0865       0.132      45.6**             -0.0942 
        (0.252)       (0.150)      (0.129)    (1.95)              (0.224) 
 
Observations        1,491         1,491       1,491     1,491        781 
 
Notes:  This table analyzes the effect of income prediction errors (shocks) in year t=j on physician behavior, following equation (5).  All models are estimated 
with two stage least squares.  The physician’s subjective assessment of whether his income in year t=j was different than expected at t=0 (see Table 2) is used as 
an instrument for the constructed prediction errors: Yj - EYj,t=0.  Observations are pooled for j = 10 years of experience, 20 years of experience, or the year in 
which a person’s income reached its peak.  (For physicians whose income has not yet peaked, the dependent variable is the change between 1999 and the 4
th year 
of medical school (t=0) in the person’s expectation for peak income: EYpeak,t=1999  - EYpeak,t=0.)     The dependent variables in columns 1-3, which indicate whether 
a physician made a change to his practice since the year t=j, can take on one of three values: 1 for an increase, 0 for no change, and –1 for a decrease.  The 
expected retirement age is a continuous variable top-coded at 75.  In column 5, the binary dependent variable is 1 if the person indicated in 1998/1999 that with 
hindsight he would have selected a different specialty in medical school or left the medical profession altogether.  Indicator variables are included for the year   in 
which a physician received his income or revised his predicted peak income.  The income and income prediction error variables are measured in thousands of 
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Figure 1





Year in Which Income Was Received (2-year bins)
Non-primary care MDs
Primary care MDs
Notes: This figure displays the year effects (in two-year bins) from a regression of the income prediction errors Yj-E Y j,t=0 on indicator variables
for the year in which income was received, and interactions of the year dummies and an indicator for non-primary care specialties 
(e.g., surgery, internal medicine subspecialties, ob/gyn, radiology, anesthesiology, psychiatry, pathology).   Experience and experience squared 
are included in the regression.  Two-year periods with fewer than 30 income observations are not displayed in this figure.
 